Abstract-In this paper, we consider joint pricing and task allocation in a unified mobile crowdsensing system, where all task initiators and mobile users are viewed as peers. From an exchange market point of view, the pricing and task allocation in such a unified system depend only on the supply and demand since no one can dominate the process, with the optimal solution being characterized by the Walrasian equilibrium. This is quite different from existing approaches, where each task initiator builds a specific mobile crowdsensing system and provides an incentive mechanism to maximize his/her own utility. We design distributed algorithms to compute the Walrasian equilibrium under the scenario where one cloud platform is available in the system. We propose to maximize social welfare of the whole system, and dual decomposition is then employed to divide the social welfare maximization problem into a set of subproblems that can be solved by task initiators and mobile users. We prove that the proposed algorithm converges to the optimal solution of social welfare maximization problem. Further, we show that the prices and task allocation obtained by the algorithm also yields a Walrasian equilibrium. Also, the proposed algorithm does not need the cloud to collect private information such as utility functions of task initiators and cost functions of mobile users. Extensive simulations demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms.
sensing applications, has drawn extensive research attention recently. It is a scalable alternative to the traditional wireless sensor networks for sensing, coverage, and monitoring [1] [2] [3] . Due to its advantages such as independent of infrastructures, low cost, highly efficient implementation, etc., MCS [4] is applicable in a large range of sensing applications such as traffic monitoring [5] , air quality surveillance [6] , target identification [7] , and so on [8] . For example, to implement an environment monitoring application in a city area, it is usually costly and complex to build up on-site infrastructures or send workers to the interested places. With MCS, mobile users equipped with portable devices are able to perform the tasks such as measuring the noise level by microphones or evaluating the visibility by built-in cameras. This greatly reduces sensing cost and promotes efficiency. A core issue is how to incentivize the mobile users to participate in the MCS.
Traditionally, to enable a specific large-scale sensing application, the sensing task initiator has to build a platform and design a tailored incentive mechanism to encourage the participation of the crowd, a.k.a., mobile users. Obviously, such MCS systems are platform centric. The task initiators dominate the whole process, trying to minimize the overall cost spent on the sensing application. In such a case, to motivate mobile users, incentive mechanisms only need to guarantee rationality, i.e., mobile users will earn more than their cost for sensing. This leads to the fact that mobile users often gain reward much lower than the value of what they have contributed and thus causes unfairness. Further, different MCS systems are independent. Mobile users in one MCS system may not participate in the sensing tasks in another MCS system even though they are more eligible and closer to those sensing tasks. This greatly limits the potential of social welfare by fully exploiting the sensing capacities of mobile users.
In this study, we advocate a unified MCS system, which serves as a generic market model. A variety of sensing tasks can be released by task initiators on the same market and then are selected and performed by mobile users. Clearly, such a unified MCS system can significantly enhance the efficiency of task performing and lower the overall cost. It thereby attracts great interest from the industry and the academia. For example, Amazon launched Amazon Mechanical Turk [9] , which is essentially a unified crowdsourcing system and have become extremely popular these days; Ra et al. [10] designed a unified MCS platform, named Medusa, which is programable for different types of sensing applications. In the model for a unified MCS system under consideration, task initiators and mobile users are peers. No one can dominate the sensing process and the whole market is open, free, and fair. Therefore, the prices of sensing tasks only depend on the supply (sensing capacity from mobile users) and demand (sensing requests from task initiators) in the market. Based on Exchange Market Theory, an optimal state for both task initiators and mobile users in such scenario can be characterized by the Walrasian equilibrium [11] . It is quantified by a price vector and an allocation scheme, such that the following three goals are achieved: 1) the market clears, 2) both mobile users and task initiators maximize their payoffs, and 3) the overall system reaches a Pareto optimal point.
Clearly, an MCS system is essentially a distributed exchange market, where task initiators and mobile users can bargain with each other and decide the prices according to the supply and demand on the market. A centralized algorithm conducted by the cloud for the pricing and task allocation is far from reality. To this end, we aim at designing an efficient distributed algorithm that computes a Walrasian equilibrium in this paper.
We consider a large area where a collection of sensing applications is located. The large area is further divided into fine-grained different districts according to the geographical locations or the main function of the districts. A task initiator could initiate a sensing task in one district or cross multiple districts in this large area. We investigate the distributed algorithms to compute the Walrasian equilibrium under the case that there is one cloud platform available and all task initiators and mobile users in all districts communicate with each other via the cloud to exchange their latest demand of sensing tasks and supply of sensing capacities. The mobile crowdsensing system is illustrated in Fig. 1 .
To compute the Walrasian equilibrium, we take a novel approach inspired by Rahbari-Asr et al. [12] , i.e., we propose to maximize the social welfare of the whole system under the constraint that the market clears (i.e., all sensing tasks are performed by mobile users). Dual decomposition is employed to divide the social welfare maximization problem into a set of subproblems that can be solved by task initiators and mobile users. Given a task request and a price for the task, each mobile user will respond with a sensing time that he/she will spend for the sensing task. It is worth pointing out that the proposed algorithm does not need the cloud to collect private information such as utility functions of task initiators and cost functions of mobile users (the cloud only needs to update prices based on the demand response pattern). The algorithm terminates when the cloud finds that the market clears. Further, we show that the prices and task allocation obtained by the algorithm also yield a Walrasian equilibrium for the original problem. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
1) We propose a new distributed MCS framework, which jointly optimizes pricing and task allocation by finding the Walrasian equilibrium. This approach achieves social welfare maximization and is thus radically different from traditional auction or game theory based approaches. 2) When there is a cloud platform available, we propose to solve the problem through dual decomposition. We design a low-complexity iterative algorithm, which guarantees that task initiators and mobile users maximize their payoffs and that MCS market clears. The proposed algorithm also achieves privacy preservation since task initiators and mobile users do not need to expose their utility functions and cost functions during pricing and task allocation. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We discuss related work in Section II. System model and problem formulation are presented in Section III. The social welfare maximization problem is introduced and the dual decomposition is exploited to solve the problem in Section IV. We present simulation results in Section V. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Thanks to the development of smart devices and wireless communication technology, extensive research attention has been focused on mobile crowdsensing. A large amount of theoretical frameworks and application systems have been proposed, which show the attractiveness and application prospects of crowdsensing [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] .
Among research problems in crowdsensing, incentive mechanism design is an important issue, without which mobile users may not be willing to participate in large-scale sensing and computation tasks [18] [19] [20] . Common methods aiming to tackle incentive mechanism design problems in crowdsensing include game theory, auction or reverse auction, application specific methods, etc. Deng et al. in [21] proposed LiveCompare that provides interstore grocery price comparisons, and it motivates users to participate by making them as contributors and beneficiaries simultaneously. He et al. in [22] focused on location dependent task allocation problem, and they design an approximate algorithm to solve the problem in an attempt to maximize the platform rewards. Restuccia et al. in [23] addressed the problem of secure user incentivization by proposing a scalable and secure framework based on Josang's opinion model and the concept of mobile security agent. Gao et al. in [24] takes the long-term user participation incentive into consideration, and they propose a Lyapunov-based Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction policy to reduce user dropping probability.
Social welfare is also a widespread concern in mobile crowdsensing. A reverse auction based dynamic price incentive mechanism is designed by Li et al. in [25] , it reduces incentive costs and improves social welfare compared with fixed price scheme. Luo et al. in [26] designed two incentive schemes: Incentive with Demand Fairness (IDF) and Iterative Tank Filling (ITF) to maximize fairness and social welfare, respectively. Meanwhile, ITF achieves a Pareto and globally optimal Nash equilibrium. In vehicular participatory sensing systems, Zhao et al. in [27] proposed a distributed optimal control algorithm, which keeps network stability while maximizes social welfare.
In contrast, we consider the payoffs maximization of both task initiators and mobile users in this paper, and a social welfare maximization framework under balanced supplies and demands is exploited to reconcile the two lateral optimization problems. Different from the auction methods where the market is typically dominated by the sellers or buyers, the solution in our paper achieves three-folds optimality, i.e., the payoffs of both task initiators and mobile users and the social welfare. Iterative algorithms are designed to solve the problem. It is proven that the proposed algorithm achieves three-folds optimization, e.g., payoffs of task initiators and mobile users and social welfare of the whole system.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. Notations and Basic Settings
Consider a large area where a collection of large-scale sensing applications locate, and this large area is further divided into l subareas with its ith subarea denoted by A i . Each subarea could be, a large-scale administrative area (e.g., a province), or a small-scale central business district or avenue in different applications. Let R denote a collection of subareas, i.e., R = {A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A l }. Let T = {t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t m } denote the set of sensing tasks, which are released by task initiators in this area. Different sensing tasks may exist in different subareas based on the purposes of the tasks. For example, the sensing task for air pollution surveillance needs to collect the data of the air quality over all subareas, whereas, sensing task for urban traffic mapping only focuses on downtown subareas or subareas with dense population. Hence, each task t i is associated with a subset of R, which is denoted by R i (R i ⊂ R). A crowd of mobile users U = {u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n } are present in different subareas according to their geolocations, and u k ∈ A j means user u k is in subarea A j . Monetary incentives are exploited by task initiators to motivate mobile users to contribute their time and perform the tasks.
B. Payoff Optimization
Mobile users and task initiators aim to maximize their own profits during the task allocation and pricing process. Different tasks have different prices per unit time they receive due to their intrinsic characteristics such as complexity and cost. For example, users expect more returns when performing tasks that require graphic information than those that only require audio information since image capture usually asks for more efforts. Besides, one specific task has different prices in different subareas of its interest due to regional differences such as their relative importance. Sensing data from heavily polluted subarea are more important than that from relatively clean subarea when monitoring pollution degree. Hence, each task t i has a price p ij in subarea A j , where A j ∈ R i . Each user u k contributes x ki units time to task t i in his subarea to obtain monetary returns. Given all prices p ij , both the task initiators and mobile users maximize their payoffs and calculate the time units they buy and contribute, respectively. Only when the initiators' demands and users' contributions are balanced, will the task allocation and pricing be finally determined. Let p i * = (p ij ) A j ∈R i denote the prices of task t i among its interested subareas, p * j = (p ij ) A j ∈R i denote the prices of all tasks that are interested in subarea A j . Then, p = (p ij ) t i ∈T ,A j ∈R denotes the pricing scheme.
Each task t i has a utility function φ i (·) to measure the sensing quality of the mobile users. Here, φ i (x) is assumed to be a monotonically increasing differentiable and strictly concave function of x. φ i (·) consists of two main characteristics of widely used utility functions [28] : 1) φ i (·) Increases with the sensing time and 2) the growth rate of φ i (·) decreases with the sensing time, which is also known as diminishing return. Furthermore, t i collects sensing data from different subareas in R i , and X ij denotes the amount of total time it demands in subarea A j , where A j ∈ R i . Since the relative importance of subareas in R i to task t i is different, φ i (·) should also weigh X ij differently when determining the utility of the overall sensing time. To obtain X ij units time in subarea A j , t i has to pay p ij X ij to the users in A j in total, which serve as its cost. X i = (X ij ) A j ∈R i denotes the vector of time received among different subareas. The payoff function W i (p i * , X i ) of task t i characterizes the gap between utility and cost, which is formulated as follows:
Note that X ij ≡ p ij ≡ 0, when A j / ∈ R i . In subareas A j ∈ R i , X ij has a lower bound X ij , i.e., X ij ≥ X ij , which means that task initiators have to collect enough sensing data in each specific interested subareas to guarantee the overall performance. Generally, given the price vector p i * , there exists a vector X i , i.e., a purchase strategy, which maximizes the payoff function
Mobile users in each subarea could contribute their time to different tasks in order to obtain monetary returns. All users considered in this paper do not move from one subarea to another since relatively long distance movement incurs extra costs and more importantly, tasks may be time sensitive. User u k obtains p ij x ki amount of money when he allocates x ki to task t i , where A j ∈ R i . At the same time, performing task t i for x ki units time will incur a cost C ki (x ki ), which could incorporate several factors such as physical or mental tiredness of mobile users, battery drainage, and bandwidth occupation of mobile devices and etc. Cost function C ij (x) is assumed to be a monotonically increasing differentiable and strictly convex function of x. C ij (·) also contains two main characteristics of widely used cost functions: 1) C ij (·) increases with the sensing time and 2) the growth rate of C ij (·) increases with the sensing time.
Note that x ki ≡ 0 when task i does not initiate in subarea A j , where u k ∈ A j . For each mobile user, its contributed total sensing time has an upper bound, i.e., m i=1 x ki ≤x k , which is the time budget the mobile user u k could use to perform sensing tasks. When the prices are determined, each mobile user decides their time allocation aiming at maximizing his payoff function.
In summary, task initiators want to force prices down so that they could purchase more sensing time and maximize their payoff function as much as possible. However, mobile users want to force prices up so that they could contribute little but obtaining large monetary returns. Then, two optimization problems arise as follows:
C. Walrasian Equilibrium
As described in the last section, both the task initiators and mobile users seek to maximize their payoff. However, these two optimization problems conflict with each other since one side wants prices to be high while the other side is on the contrary. If the task initiators and mobile users rationally determine their time demand and allocation under specific prices, respectively, i.e., they compute their demand and allocation by solving the optimization problem (3) and (4) under given prices, it is likely that the supplies of mobile users do not match with the demands of task initiators. Hence, it is desirable to reach an equilibrium that reconciles the two optimization problems while guarantees the balance of demands and supplies. Walrasian equilibrium is introduced in the following.
Definition 1 ([29]):
A market for a commodity is in Walrasian equilibrium if, at the current prices of the commodity, the quantity of the commodity demanded by potential buyers equals the quantity supplied by potential sellers.
According to Definition 1, the crowdsensing system considered in this paper reaches a Walrasian equilibrium if and only if under given prices. 1) Task initiator t i solves (3) and obtains optimal demands. 2) Mobile user u k solves (4) and obtains optimal allocations.
3) The optimal demands of each task in each subarea equal to the overall allocations of users to it in each subarea, i.e., X ij = u k ∈A j x ki , which means the market is cleared.
Since both the task initiators and mobile users obtain their optimal payoffs, their satisfaction is guaranteed at the Walrasian equilibrium. Moreover, the clearance of the market also implies that the resources are fully utilized. Hereafter, how to compute the Walrasian equilibrium of the crowdsensing system is the main concern.
IV. ALGORITHM DESIGN
In this section, the scenario where a centralized cloud platform gathers information and manages the interactions between task initiators and mobile users is considered. First, the problem of searching for Walrasian equilibrium is cast into a social welfare maximization problem with the constraint that supplies and demands match with each other. Then, dual decomposition is exploited to decouple the global optimization problem into local optimization problems with respect to task initiators and mobile users. Finally, a social welfare maximization algorithm is proposed where task initiators and mobile users solve their local optimization problems and the cloud platform updates prices based on the pattern of supplies and demands.
A. Social Welfare Maximization
To search for the Walrasian equilibrium, a social welfare maximization problem is proposed to reconcile the lateral optimization problems of task initiators and mobile users. Originally, social welfare is a concept borrowed from microeconomics. It measures the satisfaction gained by the participators of a social system. It also refers to the well being or benefits of customers and producers in the market [30] . In this paper, the resulting solution of maximizing the social welfare simultaneously solves problem (3) and (4) optimally while the supplies and demands match with each other, which means that Walrasian equilibrium is reached. Hence, three-folds optimization are achieved, i.e., both task initiators and mobile users maximize their payoffs and overall payoffs in societal level are optimal as well.
The social welfare J, defined as the sum of payoff functions of each entity in the crowdsensing system, can be expressed as the following:
The social welfare stands for the net profits of the whole society and its maximization problem is formulated as
where
X ij is assumed to hold such that the problem is feasible. The reason for minimizing −J instead of maximizing J is to construct a standard convex optimization problem. The constraints (6a) in problem (6) mean that supply and demand should be balanced for each task t i in all its interested subareas A j ∈ R i and thus imply market clearance. Under these constraints, the costs for all task initiators turn into payments for all users. Hence, the objective function −J can be simplified as
The optimization problem (6) is a convex problem with affine constraints since cost functions of the mobile users u k are convex and utility functions of task t i are concave. This problem can be solved using dual decomposition method. In problem (6), the constraints (6b) are local for tasks t i , and the constraints (6c) and (6d) are local for users u k . These constraints serve as the boundaries of the domain of the problem. The augmented objective function without considering local constraints can be formulated as
In the augmented objective function L, λ ij are coupling variables while X ij and x ki correspond to task t i and mobile user k, respectively. Using dual decomposition method introduced in [31] , since the primal variable X ij and x ki are all separable, an iterative approach given below solves the problem
where X r ij and x r ki are primal variables at the rth iteration, λ r ij are dual variables at the rth iteration, α represents the updating step size. Note that the iterative process splits the global optimization problem into m + n separate local minimization problems, each of which corresponds to a task initiator or mobile user. The mismatch between X r ij and u k ∈A j x r ki drives the iterative process to converge. Under the convergent dual variables λ ij , all local minimization problems achieve their optimal solution. Hence, the dual variables λ ij actually function as the prices p ij .
The theorem below proves the convergence and optimality of the iterative process.
Theorem 1: If α is sufficiently small, the iteration rules (9a), (9b), and (9c) solve the social welfare maximization problem, and the resulting pricing and task allocation strategies optimize the payoffs of both task initiators and mobile users.
Proof: Since the cost functions C ki (x ki ) of mobile users are strictly convex and the utility functions φ i (X i ) of the task initiators are strictly concave, the objective function −J is strictly convex. Along with the linear equality and inequality constraints, the optimization problem (6) is convex and could be solved using the dual ascent method. Also, since −J is separable with respect to X ij and x ki , it could be solved by the dual decomposition method introduced in [31] , i.e., subproblems (9a) and (9b) are solved iteratively in a parallel way, and dual variable updates (9c) provide coordination. Hence, the iterations converge to the optimum of the problem (6) if α is sufficiently small.
According to results obtained by the iterations, the convergent pricing and allocation strategy satisfy the definition of Walrasian equilibrium. Moreover, since the price of the task is determined by demands of buyers and the availability of the sellers' resources, the market monopoly is eliminated. For example, if only one task initiator exists in the area, it could announce a price at its will at first. However, no mobile users will contend for the monetary rewards at the cost of their own profits. Instead, the price offered by the task initiator decides the amount of resources contributed by the users, and the users' contributions correspond to the optimal solutions of their payoffs maximization problems. Hence, if the price is too low such that the overall supplies cannot reach the minimum demands of the task initiator, the deal cannot be realized. The details of the social welfare maximization algorithm are given in the next section.
B. Social Welfare Maximization Algorithm
In a crowdsensing system with a centralized cloud platform where the task initiators could reside, the platform is responsible for updating prices according to (9c) based on the supplies and demands information collected from mobile users and task initiators. Then, the mobile users and task initiators are informed with the updated prices so that they could calculate the optimal supplies and demands by solving local optimization problems (9b) and (9a), respectively. The procedure of the iteration algorithm is explained in the following algorithm in detail.
Remark 1: The adopted iteration Algorithm 1 decomposes the global optimization problem into local optimization problems, which can be completed by each task initiator and mobile user. The distributed feature of the algorithm makes it unnecessary to collect private information about task initiators and mobile users, i.e., utility functions and cost functions are still locally preserved, and thus eliminates extra information collection costs and privacy violations. The algorithm could be stopped by the cloud platform when the imbalance between demands and supplies in all the subareas converge within a given threshold and stay within this threshold after several iterations. This threshold affects the accuracy of the solutions and the number of iterations required.
It is noted that the complexity of the proposed Algorithm 1 depends on the number of entities, i.e., the mobile users, task initiators, and the subareas, involved in the crowdsensing system. However, for the mobile users and task initiators themselves, they do not need to consider the whole system but instead focus on their own optimization problems, which are all small scale and convex. Moreover, the proposed algorithm is an iterative one, which requires communication between participators and the cloud and thus induces cost. However, there are at least two advantages to adopt distributed iterative al- gorithms. First, distributed iterative algorithms are robust and scalable to population variation. Hence, mobile users could easily join or leave the system without tampering the operation of the whole system. Second, it is unnecessary and insecure to collect the participators' private information so that the distributed iterative algorithm alleviates the privacy and security concerns. Moreover, thanks to the development and deployment of Long Term Evolution (LTE) and wireless networks, mobile devices nowadays have easy access to LTE or Wi-Fi and thus communication should not be a significant issue.
C. Application Scenario
In this section, an application scenario is exploited to explain the proposed theoretical framework.
Considering two sensing task initiators, one is interested in measuring ambient noise level, and the other is concerned with the air pollution level. These two task initiators release sensing tasks via a cloud platform and provide monetary rewards to motivate mobile users to participate in the sensing activities. The sensing area is divided into several subareas based on administrative division or natural geographical characteristics. The goal of the initiators is to collect adequate sensing data in each subarea at the cost of as few monetary expenditures as possible, i.e., maximizing their payoffs (utility minus provided monetary rewards as given in (1)). The sensing data that determine the utility of the sensing tasks are then fused to create the noise/air pollution overviews of the whole sensing area.
In each subarea, for the mobile users, they devote their time and mobile device resources to performing the sensing tasks in order to gain monetary rewards. This kind of devotion will incur cost, e.g., laborious work, mobile device resources consumption including energy, system resources, bandwidth, etc. The induced cost varies from person to person due to different time and resources availability. Based on the unit monetary returns, the mobile users could decide how much time they would contribute to any one of the sensing tasks such that their payoffs (monetary rewards minus incurred cost as given in (2)) reach optimality.
Thus, a negotiation exists between the task initiators and mobile users. From the point view of a free market, neither the task initiators nor the mobile users are able to dominate the market, i.e., prices and allocation schemes. Instead, the price leverage regulates the amount of sensing data demanded by the task initiators and contributed by the mobile users until they are balanced with each other. The flowchart of the algorithm is shown in Fig. 2 .
The Algorithm 1 solves the aforementioned problems perfectly by providing an optimal price under which the supplies of the mobile users and the demands of the task initiators balance with each other. At the same time, the sum of the payoffs of the whole system, a.k.a., social welfare, is maximized, and hence the social resources are properly allocated and fully utilized.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, extensive numerical results are provided to validate the performance of the proposed algorithm. The simulation settings including the division of the sensing area, the distribution of the task initiators and mobile users, the simulation parameters, etc., are introduced in Section V-A. Then, the convergence and optimality of the proposed algorithm are presented in Section V-B. Section V-C compares the incentive mechanism in this paper with a platform centric one with respect to the 
A. Simulation Settings
In the numerical experiments, Cobb-Douglas production function [32] is adopted as the utility function φ i (X i ), which nicely characterizes the overall contributions of sensing data from different subareas. Explicitly,
where σ i is a coefficient and A j ∈R i ω ij < 1 is satisfied to preserve the concavity of φ i (X i ). The widely used quadratic function is selected as the cost function for each mobile user, i.e., C ki (x ki ) = a ki x 2 ki + b ki x ki , where a ki > 0 and b ki > 0, and a ki and b ki differ from each other since different mobile users have different level of availability and different sensing tasks are at different level of difficulty.
Here, we consider a large area that is divided into four subareas, i.e., R = {A 1 , A 2 , A 3 , A 4 },and three tasks T = {t 1 , t 2 , t 3 } are interested in different subareas based on their sensing interests. Specifically, task t 1 focuses on the whole area, task t 2 focuses on A 1 and A 2 , and task t 3 focuses on A 1 and A 3 . Thirty mobile users are within this large area, and 18 of them stay in A 1 , six of them stay in A 2 , three of them stay in A 3 , and the rest three of them stay in A 4 . The simulation scenario is shown in Fig. 3 and the parameters of the utility functions and cost functions used in the simulation are summarized in Table I .
B. Convergence and Optimality
In this section, the convergence and optimality of the algorithm are simulated extensively. The selected evolution of mismatch between supplies and demands, prices, tasks' demands, and users' supplies are shown in the subfigures of Fig. 4 , respectively. It is observed from Fig. 4(a) that the mismatch between supplies and demands of tasks vanishes quickly and converges to zero, which means that the market is cleared and a balance between supply and demand is achieved regarding the sensing task in its interested sensing subarea. The prices of tasks in their corresponding interested subareas are shown in Fig. 4(b) , where it can be observed that all prices stabilize with iterations and are different with respect to both tasks and subareas. For a specific subarea, the prices of different sensing tasks differ from each other, and for a same sensing task, the prices are different among interested subareas. The prices are determined by different supply and demand patterns in different subareas, and it reflects the fact that rare resources (users' contributions) are more precious. The evolution of demands of tasks in subareas is shown in Fig. 4(c) , where the red dashed lines represent the optimal demands under the stable prices. It is noted that different tasks have different demands in each subarea, and they all converge to the corresponding optimal demands with iterations such that their payoff functions are maximized under certain prices. Similarly, the allocations of several selected mobile users are shown in Fig. 4(d) . It is observed that users allocate their time to available tasks so as to maximize their payoffs.
To verify the optimality of the proposed algorithm, Fig. 5 depicts the resulting payoffs of the participants and overall social welfare. Specifically, several selected task initiator and mobile users are chosen in Fig. 5(a) , and it is illustrated that the payoffs of both the task initiators and mobile users reach their optimum, which guarantees their profits. At the same time, the social welfare evolution of the whole system shown in Fig. 5(b) converges to the optimum, which means that the social resources will be optimally allocated and fully utilized. Hence, in summary, our proposed algorithm obtains tripartite optimal solutions, i.e., for task initiators and mobile users, they all maximize their payoffs by adjusting their demands and supplies, while for the whole system, social welfare is maximized so that social resources are in full use. Along with the fact that market is cleared, a Walrasian equilibrium is thus reached under our algorithm.
C. Comparison
To demonstrate the advantage of our algorithm over traditional ones, a task initiators centric method is proposed in the following as a contrast. Suppose, the market is dominated by task initiators, which means that they could adjust the obtained stable prices as they want. For simplicity, assume all task initiators adjust their prices in all their interested subareas simultaneously and the adjusted prices range from 90% to 110% of the original prices. Based on the new prices p * ij , each task initiator t i calculates the optimal demands X * ij in each interested subarea A j by solving payoff maximization problem (3), i.e.,
Since the market is assumed to be completely dominated by the task initiators, they could determine how the obtained optimal demands X * ij by (10) are allocated to mobile users. To guarantee the profits of the mobile users as a whole, the allocation scheme is based on users' overall payoffs maximization. Specifically, in each A j , the task initiators maximize the total payoffs of mobile users in this subarea under the constraint that demand and supply match with each other, i.e., ∀u k ∈ A j ,
where x * is a column vector consisting of the supplies x * k of all the users u k in subarea A j . Then, the social welfare of the mobile crowdsensing system can be calculated as follows:
Under the proposed task initiators centric scheme, the evolution of social welfare with the manipulated prices are shown in Fig. 6 . It is observed that only when the prices are equal to the resulting prices of our proposed algorithm, will the social welfare of the mobile crowdsensing system be maximized. Besides, it is also worth pointing out that although the payoffs of the task initiators and the overall payoffs of the mobile users are maximized, the individual users are not able to maximize their payoffs and thus fairness is impaired. Moreover, Fig. 6 shows that the overall social welfare obtained by our algorithm is better than that obtained by the "task initiators centric method", but the optimality of social welfare in each subarea is not guaranteed since the optimization objective in our framework is the total social welfare maximization regarding all the subareas.
D. Market Regulation
In this section, the influence of the available resources, i.e., the number of users performing the sensing tasks, are illustrated to show the self-reconfiguration ability of the free market. It is observed from Fig. 7(a) that the prices of the tasks in subarea A 1 decrease with the increment of the number of mobile users. This decrement is induced by the variation on the pattern of supplies and demands. At the same time, due to the low prices to pay, the task initiators will request more sensing data to promote their utility as shown in Fig. 7(b) . Similarly, if more task initiators flood into the sensing area, the prices will increase accordingly.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have provided a framework for joint pricing and task allocation in a unified mobile crowdsensing system. Since the optimal state in such a unified system was characterized by the Walrasian equilibrium and the centralized implementation was impractical, we designed a distributed algorithms to compute the Walrasian equilibrium. When there was a cloud platform, we first maximized the social welfare of the whole system, through which we could obtain the Walrasian equilibrium. A distributed iterative algorithm based dual decomposition was devised, which was proven to converge to the optimal solution of social welfare maximization. The proposed algorithm has several advantages, such as preserving the privacy of task initiators and mobile users and shifting the highcomplexity computation load from cloud to each task initiator and mobile user. Extensive simulations demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms.
There were still some open questions to be answered, which would be our future works. First, only the time budgets for mobile users were considered in the social welfare maximization problem. However, the capital budgets for task initiators also impact the whole system, which, if incorporated, would make it difficult to decouple the optimization problem. Second, sensing qualities and trustworthiness were not addressed in this paper, which were significant in evaluating the contributions of mobile users. A simple punishment through multiplying the time allocation by some weights could still be handled in our model, but full characterization needs more efforts. Third, although computation involving private information, i.e., optimization problems regarding payoffs were distributed to mobile users and task initiators, the cloud platform was required to update prices. It would be more desirable if the prices could be updated in similar iterative ways.
